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The terms “narrative” and “development” would appear to be difficult to relate 
to one another. While “narrative” frequently connotes movement backward in 
time and would thus seem to be a retrospective concept, “development” 
connotes movement forward in time and would thus seem to be a prospective 
concept. In this article, I seek to rethink both of these terms in such a way as to 
render them more compatible. In doing so, I focus on the idea of narrative 
identity, which, I suggest, is not only about the self but about the other-than-
self, especially those goods that draw the process forward.  
 
 
Development and Narrative 
 
I am going to take the liberty of beginning this article with a brief 
bit of intellectual autobiography in order to establish some context for the 
ideas to come. As a student in the Committee on Human Development at 
the University of Chicago back in the early 1980s, I became fascinated by 
the concept of development, not only as developmental psychologists 
such as Piaget and Kohlberg talked about it, but in a more “existential” 
way, focused on the very ends of being human. This interest is still with 
me today in many ways, but at this point I am much more likely to speak 
about the good—which is to say, I am much more likely to speak in 
explicitly ethical terms. One way or the other, I continue to be fascinated 
by the idea that human lives are characterized not only by change but, at 
times, by some form or other of progress, growth, such that we move 
from a lesser state of being or knowing to a better one.  
 Another fascination emerged around this time as well. Not long 
after I arrived at Chicago, I had the great good fortune of studying with 
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the philosopher Paul Ricoeur, first in a seminar on the “Phenomenology 
of Time Consciousness,” and later in courses such as “Historicity, 
History, and Narrative” and “Mythical Time.” These courses were 
extraordinary. Related ideas were being pursued elsewhere in the 
University, too—in the Department of English Language and Literature, 
for instance, along with several others. Especially noteworthy in this 
context was the publication of the edited volume On Narrative (Mitchell, 
1981), which seemed to bring an entirely new field of inquiry into being. 
Not surprisingly, these ideas had begun to seep into the Committee on 
Human Development as well, particularly through the work of Bert 
Cohler (e.g., 1981), a psychoanalyst and student of the life course, who 
was among the very first psychologists to pursue the study of lives 
through the lens of narrative. Narrative was therefore very much in the air 
during my early years at Chicago, in disciplines ranging from philosophy 
to psychology and beyond.  
 As exciting as this period was, it created a tension of sorts. For 
while “development” generally connotes movement forward in time and 
would thus seem to be an essentially prospective concept, “narrative” 
generally connotes movement backward in time and would thus seem to 
be an essentially retrospective concept.
1
 How might I work through this 
tension? One of my challenges, both then and since, has been to try to 
relate these two constellations of ideas. As I suggested back in 1984, in a 
piece entitled “History, Narrative, and Life-Span Developmental 
Knowledge,”  
 
Although narration moves inescapably backward in its concern 
with the understanding of the past-in-the-present, the view of 
development that derives from it can retain a focus on the forward 
movement that is rendered in the texts provided. Thus, perhaps 
paradoxically, it is out of retrospection that a project, an 
approximation toward desired ends, can be revealed. The shape 
that emerges out of the past extends itself into the future. (p. 17) 
                                                        
1 As one reviewer of an earlier version of this article pointed out, this way of framing the 
idea of narrative “doesn’t take fully into account the classical distinction between ‘plot’ 
or ‘story,’ the course of actions that moves forward, and ‘narration,’ the act of telling 
that usually happens after the accomplishment of the ‘story’ and therefore may aptly be 
call ‘retrospective.’” I accept this criticism, and might have said more about this 
important distinction. At the same time, I would still posit the primacy of the 
retrospective dimension, mainly because the “course of actions” we encounter in any 
given narrative can only acquire its distinctive meaning and significance after the fact.  
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This is not unrelated to what Paul Ricoeur, in his remarkable book 
on Freud (1970), referred to as the “dialectic of archeology and 
teleology,” a dynamic process in which the unearthing of the buried past 
is, at one and the same time, a revelation of what is to come.  
Basically, then, my argument at the time was that the trajectory of 
the past articulated through narrative bore within it a certain momentum, 
a directedness toward the future. But that was not all. In a distinct sense, I 
also argued, that which we often conceptualize in prospective terms—for 
instance, what predicts what, as determined through longitudinal inquiry 
—itself relies on retrospection and narration: we only know what the 
predictors are after the data are in; the results at time 2 (or 3 or whenever) 
reveal the potential of time 1; with the “ending” in hand, the story of the 
relationship between the two can finally be told. This seemed to be true of 
development as well: only by knowing the ending, the telos, could one 
even begin to talk about it. Development, therefore, and prospective 
inquiry more generally, turned out to be a function of historical 
understanding, of a synoptic act of historical seeing that transforms events 
into episodes in an evolving narrative.
2
 Ricoeur (1991) refers to this 
process of emplotment as a “synthesis of heterogeneous elements” (p. 
21). Development and narrative were thus not so far apart as initially 
seemed. Positing the former required the latter. Development was an 
ongoing story to be told. That was phase one. It was useful but quite 
incomplete.  
Later on, in another series of attempts to work through this set of 
issues (e.g., Freeman, 1985, 1991, 1993; Freeman & Robinson, 1990), I 
found myself moving in a somewhat different direction. Development, it 
was argued (especially in a 1990 piece by myself and Rick Robinson 
called “The Development Within”), might profitably be understood not as 
the movement toward some pre-specified end (as in Piaget’s or 
Kohlberg’s theories) but as the revision of ends. Moreover,  
 
Alongside the revision of ends, it follows that development entails 
a process of reconstructing one’s past and the self in which it has 
culminated. This is simply because for every new end that is 
                                                        
2 Ricoeur’s (1981a) distinction between the “episodic” (referring to the events) and 
“configurational” (referring to the synoptic act of “seeing-together”) dimensions of 
narrative is relevant in this context. It also provides a language for articulating further 
the aforementioned distinction (in note 1) between the “course of actions” and 
“narration.” Alongside this important piece on “Narrative Time,” see Ricoeur’s 
monumental three volume Time and Narrative (Ricoeur, 1984, 1985, 1988).  
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figured in the course of one’s life, old ends are superseded, which 
in a more general sense can be taken to mean that the ‘text’ of 
one’s life, one’s narrative, is being rewritten . . . The process of 
development is [thus] an interpretive process; it always requires 
the reflective mediation of the experiencing individual, who is 
engaged in the task of taking a portion of the self as other and 
simultaneously identifying both its limitations and its possibilities. 
(Freeman & Robinson, 1990, pp. 61-62) 
 
Along the lines being drawn here, therefore, development was to be 
understood as a perpetual process of reconstructing or “rewriting” one’s 
own ends, goals, teloi, in the service of something better.  
The good news (for some) was that we had aspired in this work to 
think beyond the traditional cognitive-developmental point of view and, 
in a sense, “free” individuals to articulate and pursue their own ends 
rather than those posited by developmental theorists. Our “model,” such 
as it was, was ipsative rather than normative: it was the experiencing 
individual who called the developmental shots. We thus encouraged a 
“‘research attitude’ that acknowledges and is informed by the need to 
remain open to the variety of ways in which the process of development 
might be manifested in the lives we study” (p. 70). The not-so-good-news 
was not unrelated to these very ideas. As my colleague and friend 
Bernard Kaplan (Professor Emeritus from Clark University who passed 
away several years ago) asked, shortly after I spoke to him about this new 
way of thinking about development, “So if Charles Manson decided that 
he was developing by slaughtering innocent people (in the service of 
some “ideal”), that would make it so? Development is ultimately a matter 
of individual preference? It’s simply my story of why this new end is 
better than the old one? And what exactly is meant by better, anyway?” I 
was always grateful to Bernie for his comments. So that was phase two.  
 During the next phase, I would obviously have to come to terms 
with some of these thorny questions. The process of development, I went 
on to argue, “taken . . . in the broad sense of a progressive movement 
toward desired ends, is necessarily tied to the moral [domain], for the 
simple reason that this progressive movement is itself unthinkable outside 
of some conception of where it ought to be heading. To this extent,” I 
added, “it can plausibly be maintained that the concept of development, 
whatever the specific domain of interest, is intrinsically bound up with 
both the idea of narrative and the idea of the moral” (Freeman, 1991, p. 
83). So far so good: it wasn’t just individual preference that was involved 
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but morality and ethics. Even then, however, an important and still-thorny 
question remained. Here is how I put it: “If, in fact, there is no 
objectively-based, universally prescribable ‘ought’ to be identified a 
priori, that is, ahead of the dynamic movement of life itself, then how are 
we to speak about development at all?” (p. 83). The movement toward a 
better way would have to be argued for and justified. We know what is 
better “precisely by the juxtaposition of our newly fashioned interpretive 
context against our old one, which becomes inadequate in the very 
process of its supersession. . . . The notion of better, of developmental 
progress, therefore, derives not from a comparison of two readings of 
experience held apart from one another in putatively objective fashion, 
but rather from their relationship, from the transformation of the one into 
the other” (p. 97).  
Was this formulation any better? Yes and no. On the one hand, 
this notion of the relationship between “worse” and “better” served to 
clear a more adequate space for thinking about the moral and ethical 
realm. Plus, this perspective seemed to better handle the relationship 
between past and future. Nevertheless, there remained what appeared to 
be an overly individualistic orientation to the entire framework. The story 
of development was still the story of the sovereign self, struggling with 
life, trying to decide how best to forge ahead, dizzied by the fact that 
there was no certain path to follow. It eventually struck me not only as 
overly relativistic, as Kaplan had suggested, but a bit too existentially 
self-enclosed. That, in any case, was the third phase. Clearly, there was a 
good deal more to be done. But what?  
 
Self and Other 
 
The story continues. Alongside the tension between the idea of 
development and the idea of narrative, there began to emerge another 
tension, equally vexing and equally urgent to work through. For much of 
the time I had been working on the ideas considered thus far, the primary 
category of interest was the self—not the self-enclosed, monadic self that 
so many had critiqued but the narrative self, located in language, culture, 
and history. I was also interested in exploring memory and, most recently, 
the phenomenon of hindsight (Freeman, 2010), my perspective being that 
this process of looking backward over the terrain of the past is of central 
importance not only in “the examined life,” but, more specifically, in 
moral and ethical life, where there is a special tendency to act first and 
think later. I refer to this state of affairs as “moral lateness.”  
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One very tragic instance of this lateness is found in Primo Levi’s 
chapter on “Shame” from The Drowned and the Saved (1989), where he 
describes the horror, following liberation from the Nazi concentration 
camp in which he had been imprisoned, of looking backward and seeing 
his own moral and ethical failings during his time there. “Few survivors 
feel guilty about having deliberately damaged, robbed, or beaten a 
companion,” Levi notes. “By contrast, however, almost everybody feels 
guilty of having omitted to offer help” (p. 78). There were, of course, 
good reasons for their behaving the way they did at the time; they did 
what they could to survive. But this did little to ease their guilt and 
shame. He goes on to tell a brief story that had continued to haunt him. In 
August of 1944, Auschwitz was extremely hot, and Levi and his fellow 
prisoners were tormented by thirst. During the course of an assignment 
that involved clearing out rubble from a cellar, he had come across a two-
inch pipe that contained a spigot above the floor. It looked like it might 
contain water, so he stretched out on the floor and had a few drops. “How 
much,” he had asked, “can a two-inch pipe one or two meters high 
contain? A liter, perhaps not even that. I could have drunk it all 
immediately. . . . Or save a bit for the next day. Or share half of it with 
Alberto,” his friend. “Or reveal the secret to the whole squad.” He chose 
the third, “that of selfishness extended to the person closest to you. . . . 
We drank all the water in small, avaricious gulps, changing places under 
the spigot, just the two of us. On the sly.” Shortly after, Levi had 
encountered a man named Daniele, “all gray with cement dust, his lips 
cracked and his eyes feverish.” “I exchanged a look with Alberto; we 
understood each other immediately and hoped nobody had seen us. But 
Daniele had caught a glimpse of us in that strange position, supine near 
the wall among the rubble, and had suspected something, and then had 
guessed” (p. 80). They had been discovered.  
Looking at this incident now, through the terrible “wisdom” of 
hindsight, Levi cannot help but be ashamed at what he had done. But of 
course what is also of central importance in this example is that this 
process of hindsight, this “work” of hindsight, is very much about our 
relationship to others and to the larger world. Stories of this sort, along 
with a number of others, led me to be dissatisfied with the way I had been 
formulating things. Some of this dissatisfaction also stemmed from other 
readings I was pursuing at the time, particularly the works of Emmanuel 
Levinas, Iris Murdoch, and Charles Taylor. For Levinas (e.g., 1985), the 
primary category for understanding the human realm is not the self but 
the Other, the face of the Other, the flesh and blood person. For Murdoch 
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(e.g., 1970) too, personal and spiritual growth requires that we are 
oriented to what is other than ourselves, to that which “unselfs” us, as she 
puts it, takes us beyond the perimeter of our own egocentric concerns. For 
Taylor, whose (1989) work is perhaps most directly applicable in the 
present context, the main sources of inspiration for our commitments and 
passions must likewise derive from without, from those external “goods” 
that serve to direct the flow of our lives and their resultant stories. For 
each of these thinkers, then, it was precisely the other-than-self that 
deserved center stage in thinking about both narrative and development. 
Moreover, they had each posited the centrality of relationship in thinking 
about these issues—to other people (Levinas especially), but also to those 
other “objects of attention” (see especially Weil, 1952/1997)—for 
instance, art, nature, God—that draw the self outward, beyond its own 
borders. I also began exploring the seminal work of Martin Buber (e.g., 
1965, 1970), who speaks of the importance of “the life in which the 
individual . . . is essentially related to something other than himself” (p. 
166). For Buber, “the genuineness and adequacy of the self cannot stand 
the test in self-commerce, but only in communication with the whole of 
otherness” (p. 178). As such, “The question of what man is cannot be 
answered by a consideration of existence or of self-being as such, but 
only by a consideration of the essential connexion of the human person 
and his relations with all being” (p. 180). Along these lines, it came to 
seem that personal narrative was as much about the Other as the self and 
that relationship—or, perhaps more appropriately, relatedness (see 
Freeman, 1999, 2007)—is constitutive of the stories people tell about 
their lives.  
In much of this work, I have thus sought to rethink the idea of 
narrative and thereby to rethink the idea of development as well. Rather 
than thinking of narrative mainly in terms of its orientation to the past, I 
have tried to suggest that it bears upon the future as well: the process of 
rewriting the self is at one and the same time a process of articulating the 
self-to-be, or the self that ought to be. At the same time, rather than 
thinking of narrative mainly in terms of this category of the self, I have 
tried to suggest that narrative is also very much about the other-than-self, 
about the ends—and the goods—that are operative in the process at hand. 
In fact, as I argue in my recent book, The Priority of the Other: Thinking 
and Living Beyond the Self (2014), this category of the Other is primary; 
that is, it comes before the self, which in turn suggests that we may need a 
new language for conceptualizing significant dimensions of human 
experience.  
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The challenge has been to try to bring these two tensions— 
development/narrative and self/other—together in some serviceable 
whole. In some recent work, in which I explore the idea of narrative 
identity, especially as it is found in Ricoeur (e.g., 1992), I consider the 
dynamics of what I have come to call the “double triad” of narrative 
identity (Freeman, 2013). The first triad, which I call “spheres of 
temporality,” suggests that narrative identity emerges in and through the 
interplay of past, present, and future in the form of remembering, acting, 
and imagining. As for the second triad, which I call “spheres of 
otherness,” I suggest that this temporal interplay is itself interwoven with 
our relation to other people, to the non-human world (e.g., nature, art), 
and to those moral and ethical goods that serve to orient and direct the 
course of human lives. By linking these two triadic spheres together, 
therefore, my aim is to arrive at a picture of narrative identity appropriate 
to the complexities of its formation. I should confess that I am generally 
not the model-building type, and it still isn’t entirely clear how useful this 
particular model is. So far, I have tested it out, in writing, on only two 
cases: my mother, a 91-year old woman with dementia (among other 
things) and Keith Richards (of Rolling Stones fame), who, as represented 
in his book Life (2010), seemed particularly appropriate for the model 
(see Freeman, 2013a, 2013b). The model is thus very much a work in 
progress. Nevertheless, my hope is that, with further refinement, it will 
prove to be a useful tool for explicating some of the complexities of 
narrative identity.  
 
Adolescence and Identity 
 
The ideas discussed thus far remain rough and need to be 
unpacked substantially further. Let me therefore try to put some flesh 
onto them by turning briefly to one of the very few pieces I ever did on 
youth and youth identity (which I wrote with Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi 
and Reed Larson almost 30 years ago [Freeman, Csikszentmihalyi, & 
Larson, 1986]) that does fairly well, in some ways, to highlight the 
relationship we have been considering. Let me hasten to add that there is 
lots of good (and up-to-date) work being done on youth identity, much of 
it deriving from Dan McAdams’s ideas about narrative identity, in 
adolescence and beyond (see, e.g., Habermas & Bluck, 2000; McLean, 
2008; McLean & Pratt, 2006; McLean, Pasupathi, & Pals, 2007). But this 
particular piece actually speaks more directly to the 
narrative/development connection. Indeed, I consider it a real stroke of 
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luck to have had the opportunity to pursue the study on which this piece is 
based, because it really served to focus and sharpen some of the issues I 
had been exploring, especially the difference between life as lived and life 
as told.  
In this study, my colleagues and I focused on the relationship 
between ongoing emotional experience and remembered experience; that 
is, we wanted to know the quality of their emotional experience as it was 
actually transpiring as well as their recollection of experience. That there 
might be a disparity between the two would come as no surprise. As is 
well known, recollection, especially of the “taking-stock” sort being 
considered, is an interpretive and reconstructive process. For this reason, 
of course, it is often held in suspicion, the supposition being that it cannot 
help but distort and falsify the past. This sometimes happens, to be sure. 
But recollection of this sort—which entails what I (e.g., 2010) have come 
to call narrative reflection—can also perform important “developmental 
work,” as we called it. The challenge in this case was to try to determine 
what kind of developmental work it might perform. By looking at both 
immediate emotional experience and recollection and examining the 
intersection of the two, we would be able to have in hand some helpful 
information about what might be happening developmentally.  
Following the lead of Erikson (e.g., 1968) and others, we noted 
that this developmental work is especially salient in adolescence, at least 
in much of contemporary Western culture. The process of identity 
formation is frequently one of taking-stock, of looking inward, and trying 
to discern who and what one is, in the eyes of others as well as in one’s 
own inner depths. Following on the hindsight idea, this looking inward 
frequently assumes the form of looking backward. When an adolescent 
looks back on his or her past, Erikson had suggested, he or she does so as 
a person in transit and, perhaps, flux. One tries to find one’s place in what 
may feel like a shifting, unstable world. Through narrative reflection, 
some of this shifting ground can be stabilized, the disparate dimensions of 
one’s life brought together, if only temporarily. In this respect, narrative 
reflection, in adolescence and beyond, is often assumed to be in the 
service of personal coherence—which it sometimes is. This isn’t always 
the case, however. For some people, in fact, the challenge at hand is to 
disrupt and deconstruct this very coherence in order that a new self and a 
new identity might be born. In both cases, it should be noted, the 
developmental work being done is, at one and the same time, moral and 
ethical work, oriented toward how one ought to behave and, more 
substantively, how one ought to live.  
 
17     FREEMAN: NARRATIVE, ETHICS, IDENTITY 
 
 
Returning briefly to the study, we examined immediate emotional 
experience and remembered experience in the context of time with 
family, with friends, and alone. In regard to the former, we looked at the 
quality of experience at two different times, separated by a span of two 
years, through the Experience Sampling Method (ESM), which asks 
people to describe their experiences via a brief questionnaire throughout 
the day over the course of a week or two and to indicate how they felt at 
the time. (When a randomly-set “beeper” goes off, they are to pause and 
fill out the questionnaire.) In regard to the latter, participants in the study 
were asked to look back over this two-year span and reflect on whatever 
changes they believed themselves to have undergone. Without getting 
into all the details, what this study showed was that, for this particular 
group of adolescents, there was little change in the quality of their 
immediate experience in the three different contexts across the course of 
the two years. Their recollections, however, generally suggested that 
significant positive change had occurred. So the question was: “How, if at 
all, are these adolescents able to substantiate these subjective changes in 
the absence of more ‘objective’ ones?” (p. 175)  
I would frame this question differently now, especially in light of 
my thinking about hindsight. I would ask instead: What might these 
adolescents have been able to discern, now, looking backward, about the 
movement of their experience across the two years? I offer this reframing 
for an important reason. In line with what was said earlier, there is a 
tendency to think of immediate experience, in the present moment, as 
somehow more real and objective than remembered experience, indeed to 
see it as a kind of baseline of the real. From this perspective, the truth of 
the matter would be that there hadn’t been any change at all in the nature 
of their emotional lives across the two years but that, whatever the reason, 
they believed, erroneously, that there had. That is possible. But the stories 
these adolescents told about how and why they had changed pointed us in 
a different direction. With family, for instance, they talked about a 
developing commitment to communication and understanding along with 
an increased recognition of others’ own needs and desires, quirks and 
flaws. This didn’t mean that conflicts had ended or that their parents and 
siblings no longer annoyed them, only that they were somehow able to 
situate their experience in a broader, more expansive frame of reference. 
In the context of time with friends, they recounted their ability to move 
beyond surface talk and dig deeper into people’s inner lives. As with 
family, conflicts had remained. But their newfound capacities for 
understanding and intimacy allowed them to re-locate these conflicts, put 
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them in their proper place. As for time alone, it had apparently become a 
more positive space for reflection, for being with oneself, and not feeling 
isolated or worrying about what others might think.  
Again, it is possible that these accounts are rationalizations or 
illusions, fictions they told themselves, perhaps in order to assure 
themselves—and us—that they had in fact been growing, moving 
forward. In this case, faux-recollection would bring with it faux-
development. It may be worth noting that these (hypothetical) fictional 
changes could still have had very real effects on their identity and sense 
of self. On some level, in other words, it may be enough for one to believe 
one has been developing even when, by all indications, it is not the case. 
But we would be hard-pressed to call this sort of process “development.” 
For true development can only issue from true insight into the meaning of 
the past. In any case, this study proved to be a remarkable vehicle for 
exploring both the emotional life of this group of adolescents and, more 
specifically, the difference between life as lived, moment to moment, and 
life as told, looking backward. By way of note, I am not inclined to erect 
too firm a boundary between the two. “Life,” I have argued, is itself 
narratively constituted and structured (e.g., Freeman, 1998).  
However, there still remains a difference between this dimension 
of lived narrativity and that form of narrativity that emerges when we 
“take the time” to tell. Let us therefore examine in greater detail the 
nature of this difference and its possible significance for understanding 
the development of identity.  
  
Narrating the Development of Identity 
 
Now that we have undertaken this brief exploration of adolescent 
experience, we can return to some of the theoretical issues introduced 
earlier. To fashion one’s identity is also to fashion what Charles Taylor 
(1989) has referred to as a “framework.” “To articulate a framework,” he 
writes, “is to explicate what makes sense of our moral responses” (p. 26). 
It is a structure of hierarchically-ordered commitments, an identification 
of one’s priorities. Indeed, he offers, “we are only selves insofar as we 
move in a certain space of questions, as we seek and find an orientation to 
the good” (p. 34). I would modify this statement slightly by saying that 
we only shape and reshape our identity insofar as we move in this 
questioning and questing space. To form an identity, then, is not only 
about articulating who and what one is, but what one stands for, what one 
considers right and good. And “this sense of the good,” Taylor tells us,  
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has to be woven into my life as an unfolding story. . . . Making 
sense of my present action, when we are not dealing with such 
trivial questions as where I shall go in the next five minutes but 
with the issue of my place relative to the good, requires a narrative 
understanding of my life, a sense of what I have become which 
can only be given in a story. And as I project my life forward and 
endorse the existing direction or give it a new one, I project a 
future story, not just a state of the momentary future but a bent for 
my whole life to come. (p. 48)  
 
The movements from self to Other, and from past to future, thus turn out 
to be intimately related to one another.  
 Development, Taylor goes to suggest (in a decidedly more 
sophisticated version of some of my own ideas described earlier), is a 
process of “reasoning in transitions. . . . It aims to establish, not that some 
position is correct but rather that some position is superior to some other. 
It is concerned, covertly or openly, implicitly or explicitly, with 
comparative propositions” (p. 72). I am not completely sure my 
aforementioned colleague and friend Bernie Kaplan would like this 
either; in the absence of a correct position, an absolute position, it might 
be argued, there inevitably remains in the picture a measure of individual 
preference. What I would suggest in response, however, is that the 
positing of a superior position, rather than being a matter of mere 
preference, may instead be understood as a matter of “narrative gain,” as 
we might put it—which is to say, a matter of articulating, through 
narrative, a view of one’s existence that is demonstrably more adequate, 
capacious, truthful, and/or ethically sound than the one it has superseded.  
It should be noted that there was something of a confounding factor 
involved in the adolescence study just discussed by virtue of the fact that 
we asked our respondents how their emotional lives had changed. By 
doing so, we called forth a measure of narrative reflection that may not 
otherwise have taken place. There may have been some positive bias 
involved too; few people would want to speak in detail about having gone 
downhill. These qualifications notwithstanding, there still remains an 
important connection between narrative and development. For it is only 
by coming to terms with one’s past, in the present, that one can move 
toward the future armed with a better, more adequate vision of who and 
what one ought to be.  
With this set of ideas in mind, let me offer a few cautious and 
somewhat tentative words about the contemporary world of 
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adolescence—which, admittedly, I know mainly through my own 
daughters (now 24 and 27) and their friends as well as the many college-
age young people I have taught over the course of the last few decades. 
There is no question but that social media in particular, and the 
technologization of communication more generally, is having some 
impact on the shaping of identity (e.g., Boyd, 2014; Gardner & Davis, 
2013). The question is what kind of impact it has. I don’t think there is a 
single, unequivocal answer to this question, and the main reason is that it 
all depends on how one thinks about life and what it’s all about. I could 
tell my two daughters to look away from their iPhones once in a while 
because it is detracting from “real” communication and real emotional 
connection, and I could also tell them that they are missing out on the 
world by virtue of attending to a little machine. But they would likely be 
mystified by my perspective and turn back to their iPhones.  
Rather than waxing nostalgic, then, I want to voice a concern that 
grows out of the ideas I introduced earlier, one that is less about the 
possible unreality of technologically-mediated communication and more 
about the idea of narrative and its relation to development. I shall try my 
best to be descriptive here rather than prescriptive, at least for the time 
being. Here is what I am seeing, especially in terms of the use of social 
media such as Facebook. First, there appears to be a shrinkage, of sorts, in 
what I earlier referred to as “spheres of temporality,” a tendency to be 
focused more on the present—and, on some level, the transient and 
ephemeral—than on past or future, reflecting or imagining. By all 
indications, many no longer “take the time,” as I put it before, to engage 
in considered reflection, narrative reflection. Instead, they are often swept 
along by the tide of this or that momentary concern or crisis. Perhaps this 
is okay; some might even portray it as a Buddhist-like privileging of the 
present moment, “the power of now.” But I am concerned about this 
momentariness and fleetingness. And there is a reason: insofar as the 
examined life depends, to some degree, on narrative reflection, on this 
“pausing” that I have been referring to, then this process of examination 
is being cut short, diminished, leading to a kind of “de-narrativized” self.  
Perhaps I have phrased this wrong. Perhaps I have got this wrong. It may 
be that we are in the process of witnessing new forms of life examination, 
self-inspection, and new forms of emotional life, neither better nor worse 
than any other. Nevertheless, I wonder about this presentness, this 
rootedness in the (mediated) moment. Interestingly enough, the only other 
context in which I have used the term “de-narrativized” is in the work I 
have done on my mother, a 91-year old woman who suffers from 
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dementia. I am not suggesting that today’s youth is suffering from 
dementia! But the fact is, the world many of them inhabit is transforming 
experience and memory in radically new ways. There is more focus on 
the immediate moment, the now, of the text message or tweet, and more 
heterogeneity; there is new information coming in constantly, from 
different sources, addressing different things. It can be exciting, to be 
sure. It undoubtedly allows people (some people, at any rate) to feel 
recognized, affirmed, perhaps wanted. This may well play out positively 
in one’s identity. But with this increased focus on the present moment and 
with the relentless influx of information, there is also likely to be less 
narrative synthesis, reflective taking-stock, less time or inclination to look 
backward and see what it all might mean. Does this matter?  
Some may say no. As my friend and colleague Michael Bamberg 
(e.g., 2006, 2011) might argue, there still remain plenty of opportunities 
for narrative synthesis, for hearing and telling stories; they are just 
smaller stories, tied more to the demands of the moment. Instant 
messaging is a good example of just this sort of micro-synthetic small 
story exchange. Developmental identity work is being done in such 
exchange too, he would likely add, only in a different way, one that’s 
more ongoing, ever under construction. There is surely some validity to 
this perspective.  
But my concern stands. One of the things I argued in my book 
Hindsight (2010) was that “Self-understanding occurs, in significant part, 
through narrative reflection, which is itself a product of hindsight” (p. 4). 
I also went on to suggest that “hindsight plays an integral role in shaping 
and deepening moral life” (p. 5). This is because through hindsight, of the 
sort we find in narrative reflection, there emerges the opportunity not only 
to see things anew but in and through this very seeing to move beyond 
our previous view in service of a better one. This process is particularly 
salient in the case of moral life, where there is tendency to act first and 
think later; we can correct the errors of our earlier ways and thereby move 
ahead. If narrative reflection of this “larger” sort is a requisite condition 
for moral and ethical development and if the opportunities for such 
reflection are being curtailed by the increasing primacy of the present 
moment, the now of instantaneous communication, it may be that 
development is being curtailed as well.  
I do not offer these ideas as assertions, only possibilities. It may 
be that narrative reflection, as I have presented it here, is not a requisite 
condition for moral and ethical development at all. It may be that 
narrative reflection is not being curtailed either; it may just be occurring 
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in a different way. Moreover, it may be that the idea of “development” is 
an outdated one, less relevant to the kind of life-world that has emerged. 
So too for the idea of “identity,” which presumes a continuity-in-and-
through-difference that may be in the process of being superseded by the 
heterogeneity and “multiphrenia” (Gergen, 1991) that characterizes much 
of the contemporary landscape. Having offered these qualifications, I do 
wonder about the pervasiveness of social media technology and where it 
will all lead. What has happened in the course of the last decade or so is 
quite extraordinary, and technological “development” continues apace. 
How it will play out in terms of human development—assuming the idea 
still retains some sense—remains to be seen. 
 A related difficulty has to do with attention, which would appear 
to be more dispersed, even scattered, through the world of social media 
(Carr, 2011; Jackson, 2009). There would appear to be correlates in 
emotional experience as well; it too is frequently being dispersed and 
spread wide, moving from encounter to encounter, surging forth with the 
latest post, only to recede and give way to the next. Perhaps this isn’t a 
problem either. Perhaps what we are seeing are new forms of attention, 
more “distributed” (if we wanted to be charitable about it). But I do 
wonder about this as well, and I especially wonder about its consequences 
for moral and ethical life. I am not merely referring to the fact that there is 
frequently a certain solitariness to what is going on, the fact that it’s you 
and the screen rather than a flesh-and-blood person. I am thinking instead 
of the quality and kind of attention that is involved.  
In this context, I think of the work of Iris Murdoch (1970), who 
was extremely interested in the idea of attention and its consequences for 
moral and ethical life. Her comments on the importance of art for 
sharpening and deepening attention may be instructive. “Art,” she notes, 
“presents the most comprehensible examples of the almost irresistible 
human tendency to seek consolation in fantasy and also of the effort to 
resist this and the vision of reality which comes with success.” Success is 
rare and difficult: “To silence and expel self, to contemplate and delineate 
nature with a clear eye, is not easy and demands a moral discipline.” 
Much the same may be said for the appreciation of art. And yet, “The 
appreciation of beauty in art or nature is not only (for all its difficulties) 
the easiest available spiritual exercise; it is also a completely adequate 
entry into (and not just analogy of) the good life, since it is the checking 
of selfishness in the interest of seeing the real. Of course great artist are 
‘personalities’ and have special styles. . . . But the greatest art is 
‘impersonal’ because it shows us the world, our world and not another 
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one, with a clarity which startles and delights us simply because we are 
not used to looking at the real world at all” (p. 63). As Murdoch goes on 
to suggest, “It is important too that great art teaches us how real things 
can be looked at and loved without being seized and used, without being 
appropriated into the greedy organism of the self.” As noted earlier, she 
refers to this process as “unselfing,” and it is central to moral and ethical 
life. For, in becoming more attentive and better attuned to the otherness of 
works of art, we may also become more attentive and better attuned to the 
separateness and differentness of people. And, “The more the 
separateness and differentness of other people is realized, and the fact 
seen that another man has needs and wishes as demanding as one’s own, 
the harder it becomes to treat a person as a thing” (p. 65).  
In speaking about attention in this way, Murdoch certainly 
wouldn’t want to claim that the relationship at hand, between attention 
and moral life, is a necessary one. There have surely been plenty of 
people who have been highly attentive to this or that work of art or 
literature or activity who were quite bad people. Likewise, there are 
surely quite inattentive people who are pretty decent folks. But if 
Murdoch is right, the scattering or diminution of attention is bound to 
play itself out negatively in the socio-moral realm, the human realm. This 
is because, in the absence of undivided attention to what is other, our own 
ego-driven projections and fantasies are bound to step in and occlude 
what—and who—is there.  
 This brings me to a second feature I am seeing in many young 
people. Just as there has, arguably, been a shrinkage of sorts in the 
aforementioned spheres of temporality, there has been a concomitant 
shrinkage in what I called “spheres of otherness,” in relation to people, to 
the non-human world, and to those basic goods, outside the self, that 
serve to orient and bring purpose to people’s lives. What has emerged, 
therefore, is a kind of double ego-centricity, both temporal and relational, 
and in turn a possible involution of certain aspects of emotional life. I 
could be wrong about all of this too. What may be more solitary and self-
enclosed on one level (insofar as it’s just you and the screen) may be 
more social on another. As such, and again, we may simply be 
encountering new forms of sociality, less focused on the fleshy intimacy 
of the face-to-face relation and, once again, more “distributed.”  
It is difficult, however, for me not to see some of what is going on 
as a problem, a loss. It is a loss of the flesh-and-blood other, the face of 
the other, and if Levinas (e.g., 1985) is right about the significance of the 
face, there cannot help but be a diminution in responsiveness and 
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responsibility. From Levinas’s perspective, moreover, there cannot help 
but be a diminution in one’s very being, for “responsibility [is] the 
essential, primary and fundamental structure of subjectivity” (p. 95). The 
comment I just made about the loss of world—the non-human Other—is 
relevant here too. In attending to a machine, in some instances for many 
hours per day, one deprives oneself of the existential “nourishment” the 
world can provide, and without this nourishment the self is sure to be 
depleted in some way. As I suggest in The Priority of the Other (2014), 
the dispersion of attention—not just in the contexts of social media but in 
the context of busy, chaotic, even fragmented lives (of the sort many of us 
live)—can result in a kind of existential undernourishment or 
malnourishment; we can become self-enclosed, even “autistic” in a way, 
just focused on the next task, the next thing to be done.  
I don’t want to go too far with this way of thinking either. For one, 
others have already done it (e.g., Turkle, 2011). For another, the world of 
today’s youth is, again, different from the one that shaped my own 
identity, and it is important to be cautious about proclaiming it a lesser 
one. Indeed, it may be that different criteria—indeed different kinds of 
criteria—need to be brought to bear on the issues in question, ones that 
are more hermeneutically appropriate to what is going on now. This is 
surely what my own daughters would say (though not in these exact 
words!). I love them dearly. But they are hardly the last word.  
In closing, I want to address one final idea, more directly related 
to the kind of emotional evocation that some others whose pieces are 
included in the present volume are concerned with. According to Paul 
Ricoeur (1981b), human action and human speech may themselves be 
regarded as “texts” of a sort. In the era of social media, the textuality of 
human action and language are in the process of being transformed. So 
too is the process of “reading” others. The question is how these new 
forms of textuality and reading might affect the dynamics of emotional 
education—whether, for instance, they serve to blunt the kind of 
emotional tonality that accrues from the intimacy of the face-to-face 
relation. Consider the emoticon in this context. In a recent text message to 
one of my daughters, I ended with a smiley face, a heart, and a beer mug. 
I am sure she had some idea of what I was feeling; all she had to do was 
add up the three symbols, do a bit of emotional synthesis, and arrive at the 
feeling in question. Clearly, I was a happy, loving, beer-quaffing dad, 
raising my mug in celebration of something or other. Is there a need to 
tell her more than this? Or am I pining for the old pre-emoticon days, 
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when the messages and end of message signings-off were fuller, more 
complete?  
There is no doubt but that the kinds of changes we have been 
considering in last few pages will have a significant impact on our moral 
and ethical lives. It is already happening. How it will all turn out in terms 
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